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Executive summary 
 
In response to Congressional requests, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) has conducted a comparative analysis of the farm bills approved by the 
House of Representatives in October 2001 and the Senate in February 2002.  The analysis 
focuses on the commodity market, government cost, and farm income effects of the first 
two titles of each bill, the titles dealing with commodity and conservation programs. 
 
The two bills have many things in common.  Both bills would provide increased 
government spending on commodity and conservation programs relative to a continuation 
of current law.  Both would create a new counter-cyclical payment program and would 
continue to provide support to commodities through marketing loans and through 
payments not tied to production or prices.  Provisions related to peanuts, the 
Conservation Reserve Program, and many other programs are also similar. 
 
The bills also differ in key respects.  The House bill provides most of its 
additional commodity support in payment programs not tied to current production.  The 
Senate bill provides much of its additional support through higher loan rates that are only 
available on crops actually produced.  Conservation program spending is higher in the 
Senate bill. The Senate bill also creates a new dairy payment program and imposes 
tighter payment limitations on program recipients.  
 
Relative to a current policy baseline prepared in early 2001, FAPRI estimates the 
following consequences of the first two titles of the bills. 
 
• Net outlays on commodity and conservation programs over the next 10 years 
would increase by $59.8 billion for the House bill and by $63.5 billion for the 
Senate bill.  Comparable estimates by the Congressional Budget Office were 
$61.4 billion for the House bill and $59.9 billion for the Senate. 
• The Senate bill would result in higher government costs in 2002 and 2003, but the 
House bill would result in higher spending in seven of the next eight years.   
• House commodity program spending is higher than that for the Senate for the 10-
year period as a whole. 
• The Senate bill results in slightly more acreage planted to major crops than the 
House bill, and the biggest increases are for wheat and feed grains.  
• Payment limitation provisions in the Senate bill could have proportionally larger 
effects on cotton and rice producers than on producers of other crops. 
• The Senate dairy provisions would result in slightly higher average returns to milk 
production in 2002-06 than under the House bill, with a greater increase in returns 
to farmers in the Northeast than in the rest of the country. 
• The House bill increases average annual net farm income over the next ten years 
by $4.4 billion over the baseline, while the corresponding increase under the 
Senate bill is $4.1 billion.   
• In 2002, there is approximately a one in three chance that either bill would cause 
the United States to exceed its World Trade Organization limit on amber box farm 
subsidies.  The probabilities decline in later years. 
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The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) has been heavily 
involved in analysis of various farm program options as the 2001/2002 farm bill debate 
has unfolded.  Typically, the Institute analyzes new policy options at the request of 
members of Congress.  In this case, the unit has had a long-standing request from the 
House Committee on Agriculture to develop a comparative analysis of the House and 
Senate versions of the farm bill as soon as possible.  It is FAPRI's mission to provide 
non-advocacy analysis of policy options; FAPRI provides the analysis, but does not 
condemn nor condone any option analyzed.  The unit strives to provide the best possible 
quantitative analysis of the options in question and leaves the judgments to the decision 
makers. 
 
With Senate passage of its version of the farm bill, attention now shifts to the 
conference committee of House and Senate members to work out the differences between 
their respective versions of the bill.  In order to facilitate that conference, FAPRI has 
developed this report to evaluate the effects of each version of the bill on the U.S. 
agricultural sector. 
   
This analysis focuses only on the first two titles of the bills, the commodity and 
conservation titles.  These titles are chosen due to their direct and indirect effects on farm 
income and the commodity markets.  To the extent possible, the commodity and 
conservation provisions of the two bills are analyzed as complete packages.  For 
example, the bills provide for changes in loan rates, payment bases and fixed payment 
rates, and introduce a new counter-cyclical payment scheme.  The analysis examines all 
of the direct and indirect effects of these provisions in total, not as separate issues. 
Several earlier studies have looked at some of these concerns as separate issues and the 
reader is referred to www.fapri.missouri.edu or www.fapri.iastate.edu for these earlier 
works. 
 
 For the most part, projections of the agricultural markets developed in January 
2001, assuming a straightforward extension of the 1996 Act are used as the baseline or 
yardstick.  The one exception to this rule relates to the dairy policy options.  There, the 
baseline assumes market conditions as anticipated in December 2001.  The decision to 
use the January 2001 baseline with the dairy update as the yardstick for evaluating the 
two proposals came for House and Senate staff.  At the time this report was being 
generated, the Congressional Budget Office was also continuing to utilize its 2001 
baseline for purposes of estimating the government cost effects of the two proposals.  
Congress has yet to adopt a 2002 budget resolution, which suggests that the provisions of 
the 2001 budget resolution remain operative. 
 
 An analytical effort such as this one requires a number of assumptions.  
Analyzing this farm bill, particularly some of the Senate provisions, requires several 
rather bold assumptions.  To the extent practicable, key assumptions are spelled out in 
detail as each particular issue is examined.  Naturally, changing these assumptions will 
change the results. 
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 FAPRI has examined the two bills using a stochastic analysis methodology.  In 
short, this approach simulates the performance of the policies under 500 possible 10-year 
futures.  Unless otherwise stated, results presented in this document represent the average 
outcome from the 500 simulations.  For selected variables, distributions resulting from all 
500 outcomes are presented in an appendix.  Crop yields, exports, input costs, livestock 
productivity factors, and several other variables are all 'shocked' in a fashion consistent 
with historical variability and then passed through the overall modeling system.  For 
example, a drought in 2003 would affect not only 2003 crop production and prices, but 
also livestock production and feed demand in subsequent years.  This analytical approach 
allows for an evaluation of the robustness of the policy options under a range of market 
conditions, and it allows FAPRI to estimate the probability that the policy options may 
produce low or high levels of farm income or government cost.  This is particularly 
important when safety net or counter-cyclical policy options are being evaluated. 
 
 Over the course of this farm bill development effort, FAPRI staff has frequently 
contacted experts from industry, USDA, and other universities as well as several trade 
associations.  The list of these individuals is too long for inclusion here, but all deserve 
the thanks and appreciation of all at FAPRI.  While any mistakes remain our 
responsibility, these numerous individuals and organizations have helped to raise the 
overall quality of the product. 
 
The January 2001 Baseline versus Current Market Conditions 
  
As discussed earlier, this analysis uses the January 2001 baseline as the 
background against which these policies are measured.  The use of the stochastic 
analytical technique tends to reduce the degree to which the baseline affects the 
comparison between the scenarios, but only somewhat. 
 
 For a number of commodities, the current outlook for market prices is weaker 
than it was a year ago.  Cotton, rice, and soybean prices are lower than anticipated in 
early 2001.  These lower prices will certainly add to the overall cost of the farm program, 
even under the provisions of the FAIR Act.  Under the House and Senate bills costs 
would also be higher in aggregate than estimated here, and the effects would certainly 
differ across commodities.  
Commodity Provisions 
Grains, Oilseeds, and Fibers  
 In general, both packages provide support to the basic commodities -- corn, 
sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, cotton, oilseeds and rice -- with similar policy tools 
(peanuts are covered in a separate section).  Both provide fixed payments and both 
provide loan and counter-cyclical payments that are triggered on price movements within 
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set ranges. Both also provide for an update of the acreage base used in payment 
calculation, with the Senate also providing for an update of payment yields.   
 
 As is regularly the case, the devil is in the specific levels and application of the 
policy parameters selected.  These major policy parameters are discussed in turn, in order 
to understand how each contributes to the government support package.  
Base Updating 
Before considering the various payment and loan rate comparisons, it is important 
to understand the different base area and yield provisions in the House and Senate bills.  
Taken together, these determine how many units of each crop will be eligible for the 
fixed and counter-cyclical payments.   
 
 The House allows producers to choose to update their base area for the entire 
farm, keyed to the producers’ average plantings during the 1998-2001 period, or remain 
with their current payment base.  For each farm, the base area must either be updated for 
all program commodities or for none.  This implies that if producers wish to receive fixed 
and counter-cyclical oilseed payments they must update their base since there is no 
current oilseed base area.  Fixed and counter-cyclical payments are made on 85 percent 
of the base area. 
 
 To develop an estimate of the new base area that would result under the House 
bill, county level data on actual plantings between 1998 and 2001 were compared to the 
base associated with each county.  If the county was determined to generate a higher level 
of government payments by updating, then the county was assumed to update. 
Conversely, if the county was better off not updating, the base was assumed to remain as 
currently defined.  The optimal decision for an individual producer may often be different 
than for the county, but this at least gave a reasonable starting point for generating a 
national estimate.  It should also be pointed out that as producers would in some cases be 
required to give up some grain or cotton base acreage to acquire oilseed base, the 
decision often depends on a comparison of payment rates across commodities.  Producers 
would have to gain several acres of oilseed base to offset the loss of an acre of high-
payment crops such as cotton or rice. 
 
 In the House bill, payment yields are frozen at current levels.  For soybeans and 
other oilseeds, a formula sets program yields based on a farm’s 1998-2001 yields, 
multiplied by the ratio of 1981-1985 national oilseed yields to 1998-2001 national oilseed 
yields.  The result is a national average soybean payment yield of 30 bushels per acre. 
 
 The Senate bill allows a producer to retain current program acreage and yields for 
AMTA crops or update both bases and yields.  Under either decision, the producer is 
allowed to add oilseed acreage based on the most recent plantings.  Soybean payment 
yields would be based on average yields for 1998-2001. This means, for example, that a 
producer may elect to simply add an oilseed base to an already established corn base, 
regardless of the amount of land planted to corn over the 1998-2001 period.  The sum of 
all program base acres cannot exceed the cropland on a farm, except to the extent that 
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there is a history of double cropping.  Further, while the House was to provide payments 
on only 85 percent of the producer's base, the Senate gives payments based on 100 
percent of the base.  Again from an analytical standpoint, county data were used to 
determine where and to what extent producers would be likely to update or shift their 
base. 
 
Table 1 reflects the current and expected base area and yield levels anticipated 
under the two provisions.  Not surprisingly, the Senate provisions should result in a larger 
increase in payment area than under the House language.  Notice in particular that 
soybean base area is anticipated to be 4.2 million acres higher under the Senate than the 
House provision. 
 
Table 1. Base Area and Program Yields for Fixed and Counter-Cyclical Payments 
Base Acreage Program Yield  
AMTA House Senate Senate - House House Senate
Senate 
- House 
 Barley 11.1 8.7 8.4 -0.3 46.7 54.7 17% 
 Corn 81.4 78.6 78.9 0.3 102.6 140.2 37% 
 Cotton 16.4 16.9 16.8 -0.1 600 654.7 9% 
 Oats 6.7 4.8 4.5 -0.3 50.7 62.5 23% 
 Rice 4.2 4.2 4.0 -0.2 48.2 55.0 14% 
 Sorghum 13.5 10.5 10.6 0.1 56.9 67.8 19% 
 Soybeans N/A 69.2 73.4 4.2 30.0 40.3 34% 
 Sunflowers N/A 1.6 3.2 1.6 11.0 15.0 37% 
 Wheat 78.4 71.0 70.4 -0.6 34.5 43.0 25% 
Total 211.7 265.5 270.2 4.7  
 
 
 The yield difference under the Senate language relative to the House is 
significant.  On a percentage basis, corn payment yields are up the most among the 
traditional program crops.  For cotton and rice, the increase, while still significant, is not 
as large. 
 
 Between the shift toward paying on 100 percent versus 85 percent of the base area 
and the move to update yields, the Senate package is clearly designed to pay on more 
units of production than the House bill.  In the case of cotton, the Senate has potential 
exposure on 27 percent more cotton than the House bill.  For corn, the Senate covers 4.2 
billion bushels more than the House.  This will be significant when total program support 
is evaluated. 
Fixed Payments 
 Table 2 compares the fixed payment rates between the two options.  Senate 
payment rates, while fixed for a given year, generally decline over time.  In the first two 
years of the program, even though Senate payment rates are lower than those provided in 
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the House, because the Senate provides coverage on the entire base area at current yields, 
total Senate fixed payments on a per acre basis are higher than those provided by the 
House.  By the '04 crop year however, the House fixed payments are generally (cotton 
and rice being the main exceptions) above the Senate fixed payments, due to the 
reductions in the Senate payment rates. 
 
Table 2. Fixed Payment Rates 
House Senate  Units 
All Years 2002/03 2004/05 2006 
 Barley per Bu $0.25 $0.20 $0.100 $0.050 
 Corn per Bu $0.30 $0.27 $0.135 $0.068 
 Cotton per Lb $0.0667 $0.13 $0.065 $0.033 
 Oats per Bu $0.025 $0.05 $0.025 $0.013 
 Rice per Cwt $2.35 $2.45 $2.400 $2.400 
 Sorghum per Bu $0.36 $0.31/0.27 $0.135 $0.068 
 Soybeans per Bu $0.42 $0.55 $0.275 $0.138 
 Sunflowers per Cwt $0.74 $1.00 $0.500 $0.250 
 Wheat per Bu 0.53 $0.45 $0.225 $0.113 
 
 
Counter-Cyclical Payments 
While the vocabulary is a little different, both the House and Senate give 
payments to producers if prices move below particular levels, regardless of whether or 
not the producer actually plants the crop for which the payment would be made.  In the 
House package the price that triggers a payment is referred to as the Target Price (TP), 
while the Senate language calls its trigger the Income Protection Price (IPP).  The exact 
levels of these trigger prices are given in Table 3.  Unlike the fixed payment rates, note 
that the Senate provides the same IPP level throughout the life of the bill.  Due to the 
mechanism used to calculate the payments, there can be no counter-cyclical payments 
(CCP’s) for the ’02 or the ’03 crop, except in the case of rice. 
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Table 3. Counter-Cyclical Trigger Prices 
 
Units 
House 
Target 
Prices 
Senate 
Income 
Protection 
Prices 
 Barley Per Bu $2.39 $2.1973 
 Corn Per Bu $2.78 $2.3472 
 Cotton Per Lb $0.736 $0.6793 
 Oats Per Bu $1.47 $1.5480 
 Rice Per Cwt $10.82 $9.2914 
 Sorghum Per Bu $2.64 $2.3472 
 Soybeans Per Bu $5.86 $5.7431 
 Sunflowers Per Cwt $10.36 $10.49 
 Wheat Per Bu $4.04 $3.4460 
 
 
Under both options, the payments are calculated by first subtracting the fixed 
payment rate from the TP or IPP.  The higher of the loan rate or the market price is then 
subtracted from what is left over (the House uses a season average market price in its 
calculation while the Senate uses the average market price during the first 5 months of 
the marketing year, a factor that results in very different payment timing).  If the result is 
positive, that becomes the payment rate used to calculate the CCP.   
  
The House provides payment on 85 percent of the base acres and uses the old 
payment yields.  Thus, the House provides payments on far fewer units than does the 
Senate.  Conversely, as seen in Table 3, the Senate IPP's are noticeably below the House 
TP's.  This is an important difference between the House and Senate provisions.  The 
House bill will make CCP’s at higher prices than the Senate provisions, but the Senate 
provides coverage on many more units of production.  When prices are low enough to 
trigger Senate CCP’s, the total payments will ramp up much quicker than those provided 
by the House. 
  
The combination of fixed payments, IPP's, and loan rates force an interesting 
result in the Senate provision.  For the first two years of the Senate bill, the sum of loan 
and fixed payment rates gives back exactly the IPP for each commodity (with the 
exception of rice and peanuts).  Under the rules used to calculate the counter-cyclical 
payment rate, this implies that there are no counter-cyclical payments in those years, 
except for rice and peanuts. 
Loan Rates 
 Loan rate levels are given in Table 4.  The House generally continues the same 
provisions with respect to program crop loan rates as provided in current law.  The 
statutory maximum for the soybean loan rate is lowered to $4.92 per bushel, with other 
minor oilseeds similarly reduced from $9.30 to $8.70 per hundredweight.  It should be 
noted that in adopting the current provisions regarding loan rates, the House language 
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gives the Secretary the authority to make reductions to these loan rates based on a 
running average of market prices and stocks-to-use levels.  The loan rate for rice is 
pegged at the current $6.50 per cwt.   
 
Table 4. Loan Rates Used in Analysis - * 
 Units Baseline House Senate 
 Barley Per Bu $1.71 $1.70 $1.9973 
 Corn Per Bu $1.89 $1.89 $2.0772 
 Cotton Per Lb $0.5192 $0.5192 $0.5493 
 Oats Per Bu $1.14 $1.21 $1.4980 
 Rice Per Cwt $6.50 $6.50 $6.4914 
 Sorghum Per Bu $1.69 $1.89 $2.0772 
 Soybeans Per Bu $5.26 $4.92 $5.1931 
 Sunflowers Per Cwt $9.30 $8.70 $9.4900 
 Wheat Per Bu $2.58 $2.58 $2.9960 
* - Held fixed in analysis, but House version allows Secretarial adjustment for market price and 
stock triggers; Senate provisions fixed throughout life of legislation. 
 
 
It should be clear that with the exception of rice, the Secretary has the authority to 
reduce these loan rates if market prices drop into a long period of decline or if stock 
holdings should become excessive.  While the analysis assumes that the Secretary would 
leave loan rates at the maximum levels allowed in the House language, they are, in effect, 
maximum loan rates.  Given the structure of the CCP program, should the Secretary set 
the loan rates below those provided here and market prices continued to face down-side 
pressure, the lower loan rate would be partially offset by an increase in the CCP. 
 
 Rather than provide the Secretary with an ability to reduce loan rates should stock 
holdings become excessive, the Senate sets the loan rates for the various commodities at 
a fixed rate throughout the life of the bill.  With the exception of soybeans, these loan 
rates are set above current provisions.  In the case of wheat, for example, the Senate loan 
rate is $0.42 per bushel above current provisions and the maximums provided under the 
House.   
 
 As under current law, as a means to preclude government acquisition of the crop, 
both the House and the Senate allow these crop loans to be repaid at levels below the loan 
rate.  As an alternative, both the House and Senate also continue the practice of allowing 
producers to take this difference between the market price and loan rate without requiring 
the product to be placed under loan.  For several crops, these repayment rates would be 
determined by posted county prices.  For cotton and rice, world prices for the product 
come directly into play.  
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 The Senate provisions also provide loan rate protection to a number of new crops 
-- dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas.  Again, the loan rates for these products are set in the 
proposed law and Secretarial adjustment is not allowed. 
Other Commodity Program Issues 
 There are other program provisions that will also affect the commodity markets.  
Both the House and Senate provide for an increase in the cap on land enrolled in the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  The House increases the CRP cap to 39.2 million 
acres, while the Senate places a 40 million acre limit.  As in past analyses, FAPRI 
assumes that there will be a net reduction in row-crop production of one acre for every 
five new acres of CRP enrollment.   
 
  The Senate stipulates much stiffer rules regarding payment limits than the House.  
Impacts of these limits will be covered in detail later in the document.  The Senate bill 
also contains language that would restrict payments to land that has not been planted or 
considered planted to a program commodity in 1 of the last 5 years or 3 of the last 10 
years.  In determining the potential impacts of this provision, the county-level results of 
the base-updating decisions were used.  For producers that chose to update base, their 
payments are based on acreage that was planted during the 1998-2001 period so they 
would not be impacted by the payment restrictions.  Producers that did not update base 
could possibly be impacted if their farms had not met the cropping requirements 
established in the language.  However, determining the amount of acres impacted would 
require detailed data on the cropping history of the farms.  In the absence of the necessary 
data, it was assumed that 25% of those acres would be impacted by the payment 
restrictions.  Under this assumption, total savings over fiscal 2002-11 were $960 million. 
 
 Both bills make changes to the current sugar program.  However, due to time 
constraints, potential market effects due to the changes are not incorporated into this 
analysis. 
 
 The Senate bill designated approximately $2.4 billion in disaster assistance for 
fiscal 2002.  Since this spending is not subject to the limitations imposed by the budget 
resolution, it is not incorporated into this analysis. 
Commodity Market Effects 
 Appendix Tables A1 and A2 provide the year-by-year expectations of plantings 
and crop prices under the baseline and House and Senate provisions, as well as the 02-06 
and 02-10 averages and the difference in the various levels between the House and Senate 
language.   
 
While both the Senate and the House provide for a noticeable increase in 
commodity program spending, differences in the form of that increase in support are 
sufficient to cause alternative market results.  The House provides all of its additional 
monies in the form of additional fixed or counter-cyclical payments.  In fact, with the 
reduction in the soybean loan rate the House actually reduces spending on loan 
deficiency payments.  As a reminder, the fixed payments and CCP's are made regardless 
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of whether or not the crop is produced.  The fixed payments are not tied to either price or 
production and the CCP's are not tied to current production. 
  
This provision of additional support to the sector under the House bill is expected 
to hold or attract resources that might have otherwise shifted to other activities in its 
absence.  In other words, the payments under the House bill are expected to have a small 
positive effect on crop acreage.  The reduction in the soybean loan rate and the slight 
increase in CRP, all else equal, would have reduced acreage in total. But the extra fixed 
payments and CCPs are estimated to offset these program effects and result in a small net 
increase in the area planted to the major crops.  For the 2002 crop year, 9-crop area 
planted is expected to increase by nearly 1.5 million acres.  For the first half of the 
analysis period (2002-06), the increase drops to only a million acres.  To put this in 
context, the total area planted to the 9 crops for these same 5 years is nearly 259 million 
acres. 
  
The mix of crops grown changes as relative soybean returns drop with the cut in 
the soybean loan rate.  With the low market price environment, soybean producers’ 
returns are particularly dependent on loan rate protection.  In the early years of the 
analysis, soybean acreage is expected to dip under the House provision by more than a 
million acres.  For the 2002-06 period, soybean plantings are down an average of 700,000 
acres.  The area planted to other crops increases in part because of the reduction in 
soybean plantings, but also because higher overall support levels keep more land in crop 
production. 
  
The Senate takes a very different approach to its support.  Much of the increase in 
Senate commodity program spending is in the form of higher loan deficiency payments 
(LDP's), brought on by the increase in loan rates in the Senate bill.  LDP's are clearly tied 
to production.  Without a crop in hand as collateral, the producer is not eligible for a loan 
and not eligible to receive LDP's.  Thus, the Senate strengthens the direct link between 
production and government support by relying more heavily on a program requiring crop 
production to get support.  All else equal, FAPRI estimates that a dollar of support 
provided through the loan program has a larger effect on crop production than a dollar 
spent through fixed payments or CCP’s. 
  
Not surprisingly, the Senate language generates a greater increase in plantings 
than occurs under the House provisions, although the increase is fairly modest.  Again, 
the analysis incorporates all of the effects of increased CRP, shifts in plantings due to 
relative changes in loan rates and payment limits.  Taken together, 9-crop plantings are 
expected to exceed baseline levels by 2 to 2.5 million acres in the first year and by an 
annual average of nearly 2 million acres over the first 5 years. 
  
Relative to the House language, 9-crop planting would rise by 1 million acres 
under the Senate provisions in the first few years.  By the end of the analysis, area would 
be up by only a few hundred thousand acres as market prices are expected to strengthen 
and thus reduce the importance of the higher loan rates. 
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Like the House provision, the relative shift in plantings is more noticeable than 
the aggregate change.  Due to the marginal reduction in soybean loan rates and the 
increase in those of the other commodities, soybeans give up acres relative to the other 
crops.  Because of the payment limitation provisions, cotton area is also expected to come 
under pressure.  Relative to the baseline, oilseed, cotton, and rice area is expected to 
decline, whereas only oilseed area was projected to fall under the House provision. 
  
With these relatively modest shifts in plantings, changes in market prices are also 
expected to be fairly modest.  With the exception of oilseeds, market prices are expected 
to be below baseline levels for all crops under the House provisions, but only by modest 
amounts.  Corn prices will dip by $0.07-$0.09 per bushel in the first few years of the 
program, but by the end of the analysis period should be off by only $0.01-$0.02 per 
bushel.  Wheat prices should similarly see the largest price declines in the first few years 
but be down to differences of less than a penny a bushel relative to the baseline by 2009.  
Soybean prices under the House language increase due to the shift out of soybeans caused 
by the drop in loan rates.   
 
Under the Senate bill, soybean, cotton, and rice prices are all higher than baseline 
levels.  For soybeans, relative changes in loan rates tell most of the story.  For cotton and 
rice, the effects of the payment limitation provisions induce producers to shift out of 
those crops with high government support toward grains, lowering cotton and rice 
supplies and increasing prices.  Cotton prices are expected to rise by slightly more than 2 
cents per pound in the first year of the program change.  Once adjustments to the new 
provisions are made, cotton prices should again close on baseline levels, as is the case for 
rice.  For rice, prices are expected to rise relative to the baseline for the first three years of 
the new policy and then hold within a few cents per hundredweight of the baseline 
through the remainder of the analysis period. 
 
Prices for feed grains and wheat are lower under the Senate language than the 
House.  Again the Senate provisions require production to receive the increase in 
government support and thus lead to larger supplies than under the House language.  The 
effects should be kept in perspective however, as the differences are only a few cents per 
bushel for most commodities.  The biggest difference occurs in the commodities that go 
the opposite direction.  Rice prices are higher under the Senate language than in the 
House due to acreage shifts caused by the payment limitation provisions.  In the first few 
years of the policy, prices are expected to average $0.39 per cwt higher in the Senate than 
the House. 
Crop Returns 
 Appendix Table A3 displays the per-unit gross returns on a crop-by-crop basis.  
Recognizing the differences in payment bases between the House and Senate provisions, 
comparing gross revenues and the mechanisms used to produce those revenues is 
probably best achieved by looking at examples. 
 
Starting with wheat, Figure 1 shows the relative makeup of receipts on a per-acre 
basis, assuming all payments possible are afforded the producer.  Note the difference in 
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LDP’s particularly in the 2002 crop year for the Senate relative to those provided under 
current law or the House provision.  As market prices recover by 2006, LDP’s under the 
current law or the House provision drop to $1 per acre, whereas the Senate is continuing 
to provide $8 per acre in LDP support.  Conversely, the House fixed payment is $15 per 
acre throughout the bill, while the Senate fixed payment drops to $5 per acre.  In total, the 
House is providing $25 in payments in the 2006 crop year, with the Senate providing $22 
in support.  Again, the totals are close, but the mix of the monies is very different.  Forty 
percent of the Senate support in 2006 requires the producer to actually produce the crop.  
Four percent of the House support has the same requirement. 
  
Figure 2 provides a similar example for soybeans.  The higher LDP’s under the 
Senate provisions are visible in both 2002 and 2006.  Even though the loan rate under 
both the House and Senate are lower than current law, the addition of fixed and counter-
cyclical payments places the total gross returns to soybean producers above that provided 
for in the FAIR Act. 
 
 
Figure 1. Wheat Gross Returns per Acre
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Figure 2. Soybean Gross Returns per Acre
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Payment Limitations 
The Senate bill establishes tighter limits on government farm program payments 
to individuals than either the House bill or current law.  Under current law, a married 
couple taking advantage of basic program rules could get as much as $460,000 in 
government payments in 2001.  Under the House bill, that total would increase to 
$550,000, and in the Senate bill, it would decline to $275,000. 
 
Estimating the impacts of the payment limitation provisions of the bills is very 
difficult.  Data constraints make it hard to estimate how much production on how many 
farms would be affected, even if current farm structures were frozen in place.  Census of 
Agriculture data on the size and number of farms are helpful, but one Census farm does 
not always correspond to one individual or entity for payment limitation purposes.  
Likewise, Farm Service Agency data compiled by the Environmental Working Group 
provide information about the distribution of payments in recent years, but the reported 
recipients are not always the same as the individuals and entities that would be subject to 
limitations in the Senate bill.  
 
A further problem is that a change in payment limitation rules would result in 
changes in how farms are organized.  In the past, it has often been possible for large-scale 
producers to organize their farming operations in such a way that payment limitation 
rules do not reduce payments actually received.  Senate bill provisions appear to make it 
more difficult for large-scale producers to avoid payment limitations through farm 
reorganizations.  Tracking payments back to individuals and changing some of the rules 
regarding the “actively engaged” test may make reorganization more complicated than 
under past payment limitation rules.  These legal issues are beyond FAPRI’s area of 
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expertise, but it is clear that large-scale producers would have very strong economic 
incentives to try to find ways to organize their farming operations so as to avoid “leaving 
money on the table.”   
 
FAPRI assumes that the distribution of farms reported in the 1997 Census of 
Agriculture is at least loosely correlated with the distribution of operations subject to 
limitation.  If this assumption holds, it appears that cotton and rice operations are 
particularly likely to be affected by the tighter payment limitations in the Senate bill.  
Program provisions and projected market prices mean that per-acre government payments 
are significantly higher for farms producing cotton or rice than for farms producing 
grains or soybeans.  
 
In the analysis of the Senate bill, payment limitations cause approximately 1.25 
million acres of land to shift out of cotton production in the short run and approximately 
250,000 acres to shift out of rice production.  This results in higher prices for these two 
crops than would have occurred in the absence of tighter payment limitations.  The effect 
of payment limitations on production and prices diminishes over time.  One reason is that 
modest increases in market prices reduce payments, and that means fewer producers 
would be affected by payment limitations.  Another reason is that one would expect 
structural shifts to occur over time so that more of the land is farmed by operators eligible 
for payments on all acres and less by those who have to forego payments at the margin. 
 
The Senate payment limitation provision is estimated to reduce government 
spending by approximately $2.2 billion over 10 years.  This analysis of the effects of 
payment limitation rules should be seen as incomplete and the results are, at best, 
tentative.  The estimated effects of the Senate provisions may be too small if: 
 
• the proposed rules would significantly reduce the number of entities eligible for 
payments on large farms; 
• it is common for one individual or entity to be the producer on multiple Census 
farms; 
• farms have increased significantly in size since 1997; or 
• market prices are lower than projected. 
 
If market prices were projected to be at or above loan rates, limitations on 
marketing loan benefits would have little effect on producers and thus would have little 
impact on production decisions.  On the other hand, if prices for rice and cotton were 
projected to be as low as they have been in recent months, producers would be very 
unlikely to plant cotton or rice on acres ineligible for marketing loan benefits.   This 
analysis is conducted compared to a January 2001 baseline where projected market prices 
for cotton and rice were considerably higher than observed in recent months.  However, 
to avoid what might have been a serious understatement of the effects, we considered a 
more current set of price projections in estimating the production consequences of 
payment limitations. 
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The estimated effects of the Senate provisions may be too large if: 
 
• it is common for more than one individual and his or her spouse to be eligible for 
payments on a single large Census farm; 
• individuals find ways to reorganize their operations so as to maintain full payment 
eligibility;  
• other producers not subject to payment limitations step in to farm acres previously 
farmed by those who are subject to limitations; or 
• market prices are higher than projected. 
 
To the extent that payment limitations affect planting decisions, they will also 
affect relative market prices in ways that affect both producer income and the cost of 
government farm programs.  Under most circumstances, projected market prices for 
grains, oilseeds, and cotton are below their respective income protection prices for the 
next several years.  Given the payment structure in the Senate bill, changes in market 
revenues that result from market price adjustments would be almost completely negated 
by offsetting changes in government payment rates.   
 
As suggested by farm-level results obtained by colleagues at Texas A&M 
University, the consequences of binding payment limitations for large-scale producers 
can be severe.  If the producer does not have economically viable production alternatives, 
foregone payments translate into lost income.  Further, in areas with high concentrations 
of large-scale producers, binding payment limitations could lead to lower values for land 
and other assets. 
 
The effects of payment limitations on smaller-scale producers depend on their 
particular circumstances.  Land values and rents may fall for all producers in regions 
where large-scale producers dominate local land markets as owners or renters.  While this 
would negatively affect the net worth of landowners, it would increase the profitability of 
smaller-scale producers who rent much or all of the land they operate.  Commodity price 
changes resulting from payment limitations could also affect the bottom line for smaller-
scale producers not directly impacted by the change in rules. 
 
Peanuts 
Relative to current law, the two bills make very significant changes to the 
provisions of the peanut program.  Most notable is the elimination of the two-price 
poundage quota program that came into effect with the Food and Agriculture Act of 
1977.  In its place, the House and Senate bills establish policies very similar to those for 
other program crops.  Both bills institute marketing loans, fixed payments, and support 
prices that determine CCPs.  Marketing loans are available on all production, while fixed 
and CCPs will be paid on payment production determined for each historical producer.  
Payment production is determined by multiplying the payment yield by 85 percent of 
historical acreage.  The payment yield is based on actual production history for the 1998-
2001 crops, while historical acreage is the average planted and considered planted 
acreage over the same period.  As a final note on assumptions, compensation is provided 
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to quota owners through a 5-year buyout program.  Exact policy levels are given in Table 
5. 
 
Table 5. Peanut Program Provisions 
 House Senate 
Loan Rate $350/ton $400/ton 
Fixed Payment $36/ton $36/ton 
Target Price/Income Protection Price $480/ton $520/ton 
Quota Buyout $1,000/ton  over 5 years 
$1,100/ton  
over 5 years 
     
Under current law, U.S. peanut acreage can be divided into two categories.  The 
first is acres that are grown to meet quota poundage and subsequently receive the quota 
support rate of $610 per ton.  The second category is peanuts grown as additionals and 
under FAPRI’s January 2001 baseline, the average price of additionals is approximately 
$350 per ton.  (An updated baseline would likely have lower prices given current market 
conditions.)  Quota peanuts account for approximately 60 percent of total acreage, with 
additionals being the remaining 40 percent.    
 
Of quota production, it is assumed that renters of quota grow approximately 70 
percent, while owners of quota grow the remaining 30 percent.  Rent paid for quota is 
assumed to be $160 per ton.  These assumptions are critical in determining acreage 
changes under either of the bills. 
 
Relative to the baseline, the Senate bill results in an average increase in peanut 
area of 34 thousand acres, or 2.2 percent.  For producers of additional peanuts, the loan 
rate of $400 per ton offers incentives to expand acreage relative to the baseline.  This 
increase serves to more than offset the decline in acreage that occurs by producers of 
quota peanuts.  Under the House bill, acreage is expected to fall by an average of 5.3 
percent from the baseline.  Declines by traditional quota producers more than offset the 
modest increase in acreage grown by producers of additionals.  
 
Market price changes reflect the shifts in acreage.  The Senate bill results in lower 
prices relative to both the baseline and the House option.  Again, these impacts can be 
directly traced back to the relative loan rates in the two bills.  Higher support levels in the 
Senate bill result in a larger increase in government outlays relative to baseline.  Over the 
fiscal 2002-11 period, the Senate would increase outlays by a total of $4.8 billion, while 
the House would spend an additional $3.1 billion over the same period. 
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Table 6. Impacts of Alternative Bills on U.S. Peanuts  
 Planted Area 
(02-11 Average, 
Thousand Acres) 
Market Price 
(02-11 Average, 
Dollars/Ton) 
Government Costs 
(FY02-11 Total, 
Billion Dollars) 
Baseline 1,578 $351 $0 
House Farm Bill 1,495 $373 $3,088 
Senate Farm Bill 1,612 $339 $4,768 
Senate – House    118 -$33 $1,680 
 
Dairy 
The dairy provisions contained in the House and Senate farm bills differ primarily 
in two respects.  First, the House bill extends the current price support program for the 
entire 10-year life of the bill while the Senate bill extends the price support program 
through the end of 2006.  Second, the Senate dairy provisions include $2 billion in direct 
payments to dairy producers over the FY02 to FY05 period while the House has no direct 
payment program for dairy.   
 
The analysis of these two bills builds on work done in December 2001 for the 
Senate Agriculture Committee (see FAPRI-UMC Report #19-01).  This analysis includes 
both the Senate direct payment program and the price support extensions contained in 
both bills while the earlier report only focused on the direct payment program. 
 
Price Support Program Extension 
Both bills extend the price support program at $9.90 per cwt, but the Senate bill 
sunsets the price support program at the end of 2006.  Given FAPRI’s December 2001 
baseline for the dairy sector, eliminating the program in 2007 would have very little 
effect on the dairy sector.  Appendix Table A5 shows that all milk prices are not 
substantially different between the House and Senate bills over the 2007 to 2011 period. 
 
The driving factor behind this result is that the underlying FAPRI baseline reflects 
strengthening demand for nonfat dry milk over the baseline and thus little government 
activity in the powder market.  In fact, after 2007 the FAPRI baseline has no nonfat dry 
milk removals.  The deterministic method used in this analysis underestimates the 
potential impact the price support elimination could have on the market.  The safety net 
offered by a $9.90 milk support price has provided a price floor to milk producers during 
low price periods, and there may well be years in which dairy markets are weaker than 
projected in the December 2001 report. 
 
Producer Direct Payment Program 
The Senate dairy provisions include two direct payment programs. One program, 
the Northeast Dairy Market Loss Payments (NDMLP), covers twelve Northeast states 
and the other program, the Dairy Market Loss Assistance Program (DMLAP), is put in 
place for the rest of the country.  States included in the Northeast program are: 
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Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia.  Direct payments 
in the Northeast are triggered off the monthly difference between $16.94 per cwt and the 
Boston minimum class I price.  Multiplying the price difference by 0.45 determines the 
payment rate for producers. 
 
The remainder of the country has a direct payment program triggered off the 
quarterly difference between the 5-year moving average U.S. all-milk price and the U.S. 
all-milk price for the quarter in question.  The payment rate for producers is found by 
multiplying the difference by 0.4.  Both programs cap eligible production to the first 8 
million pounds of milk produced in a year over the 1999 to 2001 period.  For FY02 to 
FY05, Northeast program outlays are capped at $500 million while program outlays for 
the remainder of the country are capped at $1.5 billion. 
 
Differences in Payment Rates Between the NDMLP and DMLAP 
Much of the discussion surrounding the direct payment program in the Senate bill 
has focused on the differences between the two regional payment approaches.  Three 
factors are critical in determining relative payment rates for the Northeast and the rest of 
the country.  First is the total government funding each program has available to make 
payments to producers.  The second is the correlation in the movement of prices that are 
used to trigger payments under the two programs.  The third is the base price used to 
calculate the payment rate for each program. 
 
While the NDMLP is eligible to spend 25 percent of the $2.0 billion total in 
government outlays, these same Northeast states represented 17.8 percent of total milk 
production in 2000.  The fact that these states could receive 25 percent of the total outlays 
for the direct payment program yet represent less than 20 percent of total milk produced 
in the U.S. implies that direct payments per unit of milk produced during the life of the 
program would be higher in the Northeast if both programs spend the full amount of 
available funding.  
 
When analyzing how these direct payment programs would work under 
alternative market conditions, history provides some guide.  Any analysis of prices before 
January 2000 must be done cautiously since the data on milk prices observed resulted 
from a different federal milk market order system than is in place today.  Boston class I 
prices for the period January 2000 to December 2001 would have produced an average 
direct payment of $0.57 per cwt under the NDMLP. The highest payment of $1.34 per 
cwt would have occurred in February 2000.  Using the formula in the DMLAP, the 
average quarterly payment rate would have been $0.42 over the January 2000 to 
December 2001 period.  The highest payment rate would have occurred in the last quarter 
of 2000 at $0.95 per cwt.  Historical observation would suggest that the Boston class I 
price and the U.S. all-milk price move together except in periods when dairy product 
prices are moving rapidly up or down.  In that case, the Boston class I prices tends to lag 
the movement in the all-milk price as dictated by the formula used to calculate the class I 
mover. 
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These relative payment rates based on historical prices are close to those 
estimated in the forward-looking FAPRI analysis of the Senate dairy provisions.  On 
average over the 2002 to 2005 period, the FAPRI analysis shows a direct payment rate of 
$0.45 per cwt for the Northeast and $0.36 per cwt for the remainder of the country.  It 
appears that in nearly all market conditions, the Northeast program would result in a 
higher direct payment rate than the program for the rest of the country.  Under alternative 
market conditions, the direct payment rates in each of the regions generally remain 
proportional to each other. 
 
Another difference between the two programs is the base price used in each of the 
direct payment formulas.  Under the NDMLP, the base rate is set at $16.94 per cwt 
throughout the life of the program. Alternatively, the calculation of each quarter’s 
payment rate under the DMLAP is tied to the 5-year moving average of the U.S. all-milk 
price.  If all milk prices are lower than those observed in the 1997 to 2001 period, the rest 
of the country would see reductions in their base price while the Northeast base price 
would remain at $16.94 per cwt.  This effect will cause the payment rate for the rest of 
the country to decline relative to the payment rate in the Northeast.  Based on FAPRI 
projections of milk prices, the 5-year moving average U.S. all-milk price is expected to 
decline by $0.82 per cwt over the 2002 to 2005 period.  Understand, however, that this 
result is completely dependent on the FAPRI baseline showing all milk prices in the $13 
per cwt range over the 2002 to 2005 period.  This compares to an average all-milk price 
of $14.11 per cwt over the 1997 to 2001 period.  If prices were higher than projected in 
the FAPRI baseline, payments under both programs would be lower, and there would be 
some chance that the full $2.0 billion in authorized spending would not be utilized. 
 
Stochastic Examination of the Direct Payment Programs 
A stochastic analysis of the programs provides a more robust evaluation.   The 
stochastic baseline computes distributions around the endogenous variables in the system 
by drawing from historical-based empirical distributions of the important exogenous 
factors in the system, such as the variability in milk yields associated with weather 
events.  For the direct payment program in the Senate farm bill this provides an 
opportunity to judge the program under a range of milk price outcomes. 
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of payment rates for both programs over the 2002 
to 2005 period.  The figure shows that when the cap is reached, the average payment rate 
for the DMLAP is $0.36 per cwt while for the NDMLP the average payment rate is $0.45 
per cwt.  These equate to the payment rates shown in the deterministic results FAPRI has 
conducted to date on the Senate farm bill since the FAPRI deterministic analysis shows 
both programs hitting the cap.  As discussed above, this difference in the capped payment 
rates relates to the proportion of the $2.0 billion spent on each program. 
 
 
When milk prices rise above a certain level, both programs result in lower direct 
payments than the capped maximum rates.  The DMLAP begins to show lower payments 
when milk prices are $13 per cwt or higher while the NDMLP shows lower payments 
when milk prices exceed $13.50 per cwt.  Figure 3 shows that payment rates under both 
programs generally remain proportional to each other. 
 
Table 7 provides estimates of the probability of spending the full amount of 
outlays permitted under each program and of average spending and payment rates across 
the 500 draws.  In most of the draws, both programs pay out the full amount permitted 
under the caps.  However, in at least some of the draws, average prices are high enough 
that some of the allocated funds are not paid out.  Under the NDMLP, the probability of 
spending the full amount is 82 percent, while under the DMLAP the probability is 58 
percent. The average spending under the NDMLP is $486 million and it is $1,328 million 
under the DMLAP.  By taking into account the possibility that the full amount of money 
Figure 3. Stochastic Dairy Direct Payment Rates Under the 
Senate Farm Bill (Average 2002-2005)
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allocated may not be spent, the average payment rates are $0.04 lower under both 
programs than in the deterministic analysis. 
 
Table 7. Stochastic Results of the Direct Payment Programs 
Probability of Spending Capped Outlays  
  NDMLP 82% 
  DMLAP 58% 
  
Average Total Spending  
  NDMLP 486 
  DMLAP 1,328 
  
Average Payment Rate  
  NDMLP $0.41 
  DMLAP $0.32 
 
 
Comparison of the House and Senate Dairy Provisions 
 
Appendix Table 5A shows the impacts of the House and Senate dairy provisions 
on the sector.  Milk prices for all milk classes are lower under the Senate bill for the first 
five years as the direct payment programs cause marginally higher milk supplies.  
However, milk revenue under the Senate bill is higher the first three years as the direct 
payments more than offset the decline in market revenue.  The government outlays for 
the price support program are slightly higher in the Senate bill since slightly more nonfat 
dry milk is removed from the market. The entire $2.0 billion dollars of funding for the 
direct payment programs is used under the Senate bill in this deterministic analysis 
 
The differences between the House and Senate results in 2007 are associated with 
the price support program.  Lower all milk prices are shown under the Senate bill in 2007 
as a result of eliminating the price support program.  Again, the deterministic approach 
used in this analysis will likely underestimate the importance of the price support 
program. 
 
In general, neither bill results in large changes to the underlying supply of milk to 
the market over the longer term.  Milk revenue rises by less than $0.10 per cwt on 
average over the 2002 to 2011 period relative to the baseline under either the House or 
Senate farm bill. 
 
Conservation 
The conservation titles of the House and Senate bills significantly increase 
government spending on conservation and the environment.  According to CBO, the 
House bill would increase mandatory outlays on conservation programs by $12.6 billion 
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over the next ten years relative to a simple extension of current law, and the 
corresponding increase in the Senate bill is $20.0 billion. 
 
Both bills authorize increased funding for a variety of existing programs. 
 
• The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Wetlands Reserve Program 
(WRP) would retire more acres from crop production.   
• Funding for the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) would increase 
dramatically in both bills. EQIP accounts for two-thirds of the increase in 
conservation spending in the House bill. 
• Funding would also increase sharply for the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program 
(WHIP) and the Farmland Protection Program (FPP), especially in the Senate bill.   
 
According to CBO, the Senate would spend more than the House on CRP, WHIP, and 
FPP over the next ten years, while the House would spend more than the Senate on EQIP 
and WRP. 
 
The bills also create some new programs. 
 
• Both bills create a new two-million-acre Grasslands Reserve Program. 
• The Senate bill creates a Conservation Security Program (CSP) to provide 
payments to farmers for environmental practices on working lands.  CBO 
estimates that outlays under this program would grow over time, reaching almost 
$1 billion by 2011.  Together, EQIP and CSP account for most of the increase in 
conservation spending in the Senate bill. 
• The Senate bill also provides funding for programs to encourage water 
conservation and to benefit farmers in the Klamath Basin affected by 
environmental regulations.   
 
In response to a Congressional request, FAPRI has made preliminary estimates of the 
effects of conservation program changes on farm income.  FAPRI makes no estimate of 
the effects of these programs on the environment, and without such an estimate it is not 
possible to do a complete accounting of their public benefits and costs. 
 
To estimate farm income impacts of conservation program changes, a series of 
assumptions were required. 
 
• Mandatory government outlays on the various programs are assumed to evolve 
precisely as estimated by CBO.  Spending on these programs is difficult to 
predict, especially for a program like the CSP that has no overall cap on funding. 
• For each program, a certain percentage of the mandatory government outlays are 
assumed to take the form of payments to producers.  In a number of programs, 
this percentage is less than 100 percent, as mandatory outlays cover both 
payments to producers and technical assistance. 
• For each program, an assumption is made about how much farm production costs 
would increase for every dollar of government spending.  This percentage is 
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assumed to be highest for cost-share programs like EQIP and lowest for land 
retirement programs like the CRP.   
 
CRP provisions of the bill are addressed using the standard FAPRI analysis system.  
For other conservation provisions, the impact on net farm income is assumed to equal the 
change in CBO-estimated outlays, multiplied by the assumed proportion of outlays 
accounted for by payments to producers, minus the assumed change in production costs. 
 
CBO estimates that the non-CRP provisions of the conservation title would increase 
mandatory outlays by $11.1 billion in the House bill and $17.6 billion in the Senate bill 
over the next ten years (Table 8).  We assume that about 90 percent of that increase in 
outlays would be reflected in increased government payments to agricultural producers.  
Increases in production costs would offset a little less than half of the increase in 
payments.  The resulting estimate of the increase in net farm income would be $5.5 
billion in the House bill and $9.4 billion in the Senate bill over the next ten years.   
 
Table 8.  Estimated Effects of Non-CRP Provisions of the Conservation Titles on Net 
Farm Income, FY 2002-2011 Totals, Billion Dollars 
 House Senate Senate-House 
CBO estimated change in outlays $11.1 $17.6 $6.5 
Change in government payments $10.1 $15.9 $5.9 
Change in production costs $4.5 $6.5 $2.0 
Change in net farm income $5.5 $9.4 $3.9 
 
The average effect on net farm income of the non-CRP conservation provisions of 
the Senate bill is about $390 million per year greater than the corresponding provisions in 
the House bill.  However, the average masks significantly different time paths.  In the 
House bill, the effect of the provisions on net farm income grows fairly steadily over time 
until it reaches about $700 million in 2008.  On the other hand, the net farm income 
impacts of the Senate bill grow very rapidly between 2002 and a peak of $1.3 billion in 
2006, but then decline to less than $1.0 billion by 2010.  Senate provisions that would cut 
authorized spending on EQIP, WHIP, WRP and FPP in 2007 from their 2006 levels 
explain the different time paths. 
 
Many of the particular assumptions made in constructing these estimates could be 
questioned, so the estimated farm income impacts should be considered fragile 
approximations at best.  In several cases, it is extremely difficult to estimate impacts 
without knowing how USDA would implement the provisions.  Even if one knew how 
regulations would be written and implemented, it is hard to predict how producers would 
respond to the opportunities provided by the proposed new and expanded programs. 
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Sector Aggregates 
Government Cost 
Due to changes in the commodity and conservation titles, total CCC outlays over 
the next 10 fiscal years are expected to sum to $170.2 billion under the House provisions 
and $174.0 under the Senate language (Table 9).  This is an increase in spending relative 
to an extension of the FAIR Act of $59.8 billion for the House bill and $63.5 billion for 
the Senate.  This compares to CBO’s cost estimates of $61.4 billion and $59.9 billion for 
the House and Senate provisions respectively.  Again, in this analysis, the additional costs 
are associated with changes to the commodity and conservation titles only. 
 
Table 9. Net CCC Outlays, Billion Dollars 
 FY02-06 Total FY02-11 Total
Baseline $62.3 $110.5
House Bill $93.4 $170.2
Senate Bill $99.8 $174.0
Senate - House $6.4 $3.7
 
 
The Senate spends an estimated total of $3.7 billion more on commodity and 
conservation programs than the House.  While this is a significant amount of money, it 
does reflect a difference of only 2%.  Given all of the various assumptions and other 
approximations needed to develop this analysis, the two options are nearly identical.   
 
 Timing of the outlays should be discussed.  As shown in Table A4, outlays under 
the House version of the bill would be much lower than the Senate in fiscal 2002.  This is 
largely due to the timing of payments.  Under the House provisions, final CCP's would 
not be made until the end of the crop year, sliding the ’02-crop corn payment into fiscal 
2004.  After the first two years of the program, spending is higher under the House 
provisions than the Senate.  Using wheat as an example, spending under the Senate is $1 
billion higher in fiscal year 2002 than the House.  Spending under the House provisions is 
higher than under the Senate in subsequent years.  Over the 10 years, House spending on 
wheat totals $3.5 billion more than the Senate.  The same pattern holds for cotton and 
rice. 
   
 In total, commodity and conservation spending under the Senate package exceeds 
the House language by $6.4 billion in the fiscal year 02-06 period, but only $3.7 billion 
over the 10 year period, implying that the House outspends the Senate by $2.7 billion in 
the last five years of the analysis. 
 
 Beyond the commodities discussed earlier, the Senate spends more on soybeans 
and peanuts than does the House throughout the 10-year period.  Peanut spending 
averages $168 million more in the Senate, with soybean outlays averaging $390 million 
higher.  Conservation spending is higher in the Senate by an average of nearly $660 
 24
million.  There are specific programs within the conservation title where the House 
outspends the Senate, but there are also programs in the Senate title that are not found in 
the House package. 
 
Farm Income 
 Before discussing the differences in the farm income estimates, one should pay 
careful attention to the similarities.  Over the 10-year period, the difference in net farm 
income is an average of only $290 million out of $47.3 billion (Table 10).  $290 million 
is a noticeable amount of money, but is only 0.6 percent of the average net income figure.   
 
 The pattern of income also reflects some of the same timing issues.  Fixed 
payments under the Senate language are up $4.3 billion relative to current law in 2002 
due to the higher fixed payment rate than is established in the FAIR Act and the increase 
in payment units because of base area and yield updates.  LDP’s are up by $1.3 billion 
under the Senate language in 2002.  Increases under the House language on the other 
hand derive almost entirely from the increase in the fixed payment rate and the CCP’s.  
Due to the timing on calculations for the CCP’s under the House language, those do not 
show up in farm income estimates until 2003.  Taking this discussion a bit further, due to 
the 12-month season average price calculation under the House provision, the last CCP 
made on the 2002 crop of corn will not occur until fiscal year 2004.  Thus, while the 
House provides a significant increase in support for the 2002 crop relative to current law, 
the timing of that support is spread over three fiscal years, whereas much of the Senate 
support is concentrated in only two.  Consequently, the Senate provisions appear to 
provide a significant bump in farm income in 2002 when compared to either the House 
bill or current law.   
 
Table 10. Net Farm Income, Billion Dollars 
Cal Yr Baseline House Bill Senate Bill Senate-House 
2002 $37.48 $38.29 $44.59 $6.30 
2003 $41.72 $48.18 $48.73 $0.55 
2004 $43.33 $49.49 $47.50 -$1.99 
2005 $43.02 $48.80 $48.42 -$0.37 
2006 $41.98 $47.33 $45.72 -$1.61 
2007 $42.57 $47.18 $46.19 -$1.00 
2008 $44.08 $48.18 $47.28 -$0.91 
2009 $44.73 $48.56 $47.32 -$1.24 
2010 $45.56 $49.00 $47.65 -$1.35 
2011 $46.16 $49.32 $47.99 -$1.33 
     
02-06 Avg $41.51 $46.42 $46.99 $0.58 
02-11 Avg $43.06 $47.43 $47.14 -$0.29 
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 Results in 2003 continue to play this out.  Again, the increase in fixed payment 
rates under the House adds another $1.1 billion in government support.  Further, some of 
the CCP’s under the House provisions start to flow in 2003, further minimizing the 
differences between the two bills.  Going in the other direction, however, dairy outlays – 
mainly in the form of direct payments – are approximately $1 billion higher under the 
Senate language than the House in 2003. 
 
By 2004, however, House CCP provisions have fully come on line, fixed payment 
rates under the Senate language have been reduced, and dairy payments are beginning to 
ratchet down, placing the House bill in a position to consistently provide higher income 
levels than those observed in the Senate version.  In the last 5 years, farm income 
averages $1.16 billion higher under the House language. 
  
Recall that outlays under the House bill averaged slightly lower than the Senate 
version.  Part of the farm income effects under the Senate version come in the form of 
higher conservation payments, payments that are at least in part associated with cost 
share programs and other activities that will require the producer to spend at least part of 
the federal assistance in order to receive the payment.  As such, these programs have less 
of an effect on farm income than do the direct commodity provisions.  These programs 
may have effects for society as a whole that are not reflected in farm income estimates. 
 
The WTO Perspective: Implications for AMS Expenditures 
 
Determining the WTO implications of the additional spending under each of the 
farm bill proposals is ultimately dependent on the classification of the payments.  
Programs that are considered trade distorting are placed in the amber box and have an 
aggregate spending limit attached to them.  However, not all of the spending on amber 
box programs counts against the limit.  The de minimis rule exempts spending on amber 
box programs if that spending is below a set percentage of the value of production.  For 
the United States, the de minimis percentage is five percent.  If spending is below five 
percent of the value of production, then none of the spending counts against the limit.  If 
spending is above five percent of the value of production, then all of the spending counts 
against the limit.  The de minimis rule is applied in two ways, depending on the type of 
program.  Amber box programs are divided into two types:  product-specific and non-
product-specific.  For product-specific amber box programs, the total amount of spending 
on a product is compared to five percent of the value of production for that product.  For 
non-product-specific amber box programs, the total amount of all non-product-specific 
amber box programs is compared to five percent of the value of all agricultural 
production in the United States. 
 
The counter-cyclical payments for program crops under the proposals are 
assumed to be non-product-specific amber box spending because they are triggered by 
current prices but do not require farmers to produce the payment crop.  While other 
interpretations are certainly possible, this assumption follows the classification of the 
market loss assistance payments by the USDA.  The fixed payments are classified as 
 26
minimally trade distorting (green box) spending, following the classification of AMTA 
payments under the current program.  Thus, the fixed payments do not enter into the 
analysis here.  The changes in the peanut program essentially make peanuts a program 
crop, thus the classification of peanuts follows the program crop classification.  The 
peanut quota compensation program is classified as green box because the payment 
structure is the same as a fixed payment program.  The dairy market loss assistance 
programs are classified as product-specific amber box since farmers have to produce to 
receive payments and the payments are tied to current prices.  Net crop insurance 
indemnities are also placed in the non-product-specific amber box, following the 
classification by USDA.  Aggregate measures of support (AMS) are assumed for other 
non-product-specific spending ($0.4 billion).  For this analysis, we concentrate on the 
2002, 2006, and 2010 crop years for barley, corn, upland cotton, oat, rice, sorghum, 
soybean, wheat, dairy, sugar, and peanuts.  In this analysis, we do not account for 
provisions that allow the Secretary to limit payments if spending would exceed the WTO 
limits.  However, the analysis provides some indication of the likelihood that the 
Secretary would need to use this authority. 
 
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the United States agreed to 
limit spending on domestic support programs that are considered trade distorting (amber 
box spending) to $19.1 billion per year.  Given the structure of the proposed policy 
changes, we calculate the probabilities that the U.S. would exceed this limit in the 2002, 
2006, and 2010 marketing years.  We examine four different scenarios:  the current farm 
bill without a dairy price support extension, the House farm bill with dairy price support 
extensions to December 2011, and the Senate farm bill with dairy price support 
extensions to December 2006 (the Senate language) and December 2011 (the House 
language).  
 
Table 11 shows the probabilities of exceeding the amber box limit under each of 
the scenarios.  These probabilities are contingent on the 2001 FAPRI baseline.  Given 
current product prices, probabilities would be different from those shown below.  Both 
the House and Senate proposals raise the probability that the United States exceeds the 
limit.  Over the projection period, price increases result in smaller marketing loan and 
counter-cyclical program expenditures, which decrease the probabilities of exceeding the 
limit under all of the scenarios.  These probabilities differ from earlier FAPRI estimates 
for several reasons.  We have incorporated the changes to the dairy, sugar, and peanut 
programs, along with the changes in the Senate proposal as approved by the full Senate.  
The effect of the dairy price support timing can be seen in the 2006 figures.  For WTO 
accounting, the 2006 dairy marketing year covers October 2006 to September 2007.  
Therefore, if the dairy support program expires in December 2006, then the dairy support 
program covers only three months of the 2006 dairy marketing year.  If the dairy price 
support program expires in December 2011, then the dairy support program covers the 
entire 2006 dairy marketing year. 
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Table 11.  Probabilities of Exceeding WTO “amber box” Limits 
 Product Marketing Year 
Farm Policy 2002 2006 2010 
  Current w/o Dairy 4.6% 0.8% 0.3% 
  House w/ Dairy to 2011 35.9% 20.6% 7.9% 
  Senate w/ Dairy to 2006 30.3% 9.7% 2.6% 
  Senate w/ Dairy to 2011 30.3% 15.0% 6.2% 
 
These probabilities also seem to be in contradiction with average levels of non-de 
minimis amber box spending under the various proposals.  For example, for the 2002 
product-marketing year, the Senate proposal has an average estimated amount of $15.8 
billion counting against the limit.  For the House proposal, this figure is $15.2 billion.  So 
while the House proposal has a higher probability of exceeding the limit than the Senate 
proposal, it also has a lower average level of counted spending than the Senate proposal.  
The key to this “contradiction” is the application of the de minimis rule.  The House 
proposal concentrates relatively more money in non-product-specific programs (such as 
the counter-cyclical payment program), while the Senate proposal concentrates more in 
product-specific programs (such as the marketing loan program).  For example, the de 
minimis rule will allow roughly $10 billion (five percent of the total value of U.S. 
agricultural production) in non-product-specific amber box spending to occur without 
counting it against the limit.  However, once the spending exceeds the five percent rule, 
then all of the $10 billion of the spending counts against the limit.  The House proposal 
triggers the counting of non-product-specific amber box spending more than the Senate 
proposal does. 
 
To provide an example of the effect of the de minimis rule, let us look at a simplified 
version of program crop expenditures under the House and Senate proposals for 2006 
with the following list of assumptions: 
• commodity prices are at set percentages of the House loan rates,  
• actual production is at the 2001 FAPRI baseline level for the 2006 crop 
year, 
• the de minimis rule will allow $10 billion in non-product-specific spending 
before counting it against the limit, 
• crop insurance net indemnities and other non-product-specific program 
spend $2.2 billion, and  
• the dairy, sugar, and peanut programs account for $5.6 billion under the 
House proposal and $5.8 billion under the Senate proposal. 
 
Table 12 shows the spending under the two types of amber box programs and the 
amounts that count against the spending limit. 
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Table 12.  Example of de minimis Rule 
Proposal Type of Spending Price is X % of House Loan Rate 
  105% 95% 
  (Billion $) 
Product-specific $5.6 $8.1 
Non-specific $9.4 $11.2 
Total $15.0 $19.2 
   
House 
After de minimis $5.6 $19.2 
    
Product-specific $7.8 $12.7 
Non-specific $7.9 $8.0 
Total $15.7 $20.7 
   
Senate 
After de minimis $7.8 $12.7 
 
With prices at 105 percent of the House loan rates, the Senate proposal allocates 
more funds on amber box programs than the House proposal and the de minimis rule 
exempts all non-specific spending under both the House and Senate proposals.  With 
prices at 95 percent of the House loan rates, the Senate proposal still allocates more funds 
on amber box programs than the House proposal, but the House proposal has more of its 
spending count against the limit due to the loss of the de minimis rule exemption on its 
non-specific spending.  It is due to situations like this that the Senate proposal can have 
higher average amber box spending, but the House proposal can have higher probabilities 
of exceeding the amber-box spending limit. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 In terms of marketplace effects, both the House and Senate language provide little 
movement relative to the FAIR Act.  Producers still have a great deal of freedom in 
determining their crop selection.  Most government programs are intentionally structured 
so as to not provide a floor to market prices or serve as the stock-holder of last resort.  
The Senate provisions do require production in order to receive the benefits of higher 
loan rates, and as such, plantings and production are higher under the Senate language 
than the House or current law.  Offsetting some of the impetus for higher acreage in the 
Senate bill are limits on plantings caused by issues such as payment limitations and the 
increase in the CRP.  Taken together, however, average plantings to the 9-crops under the 
Senate bill are up on average 1.9 million acres in the first five years (0.7%) and 1.3 
million acres over the ten-year period (0.4%) relative to the baseline.  Plantings increase 
under the House language as well, due to the overall increase in government support, but 
by roughly half the extent generated by the Senate language.   
 
 The Senate does provide more government spending in the first few years of the 
program than the House.  This, again, is due in part to the timing of CCP payments under 
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the House language, but is also due to the increase in fixed payments provided for by the 
Senate in 2002 and 2003.  This increase in fixed payments in the Senate relative to the 
House is primarily due to the increase in the units on which payments are made.  
Allowing for yield updates and paying on the entire base area (which will also likely be 
larger under the Senate provisions) drive this change.   
 
 The Senate also provides much more of its support in the form of conservation 
payments.  In total, the Senate spends $6.6 billion more on conservation than does the 
House.  These payments will go to improving the farm income picture, but in a much 
different fashion than commodity program spending.  For commodity program spending, 
much of the additional government dollar goes into added farm income.  For conservation 
spending, the producer is frequently asked to change production practices, invest in new 
technology or forego revenue streams in order to improve the environmental performance 
of the farm.  To a large extent, the costs to producers associated with acquiring an 
environmental dollar will be higher than those associated with obtaining a commodity 
program dollar.  Consequently, the income effects will be different for a conservation 
dollar as opposed to a commodity dollar. 
 
 There are some definite philosophical differences between the two bills.  The 
Senate emphasizes a greater role for commodity program spending that is attached 
directly to production than does the House.  The Senate establishes a direct payment 
program for dairy.  The Senate also places greater emphasis on conservation programs 
than is done in the House.  There are a number of side issues that also put a much 
different philosophical bent to the Senate provisions.  Payment limitations, restrictions on 
payments to previously cropped land, water conservation provisions are but a sampling of 
other issues in difference. 
 
 Conversely, the House package provides higher spending levels for the program 
crops.  It also provides for a more steady level of expenditures, particularly once past the 
first year of the analysis. 
 
 The effects on WTO on the two options are somewhat counter-intuitive, but are 
the direct result of the specific rules of the agreement.  The Senate package tends to 
provide a higher amount of commodity-specific amber box support than the House.  The 
House has the potential to provide enough additional support in non-commodity specific 
payments that it trips the de minimis rule.  This causes all of the monies to count against 
the AMS limit, while the Senate does not face this problem.  In other words, even though 
the Senate support is more closely tied to production, the rules suggest that the House 
provisions come closer to triggering a WTO concern. 
 
 Again, a number of individuals from outside the organization have and hopefully 
will continue to provide comment and support in this analysis.  Their help is gratefully 
acknowledged, but any responsibility for errors lie within FAPRI. 
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Appendix I – Comparison Tables 
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Table A1. Impacts of Alternative Farm Bills on Planted Area
Crop Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 02-06 Avg 02-10 Avg
9-Crop Total (Million Acres)
  Baseline Policies 257.80 256.94 257.38 257.83 258.19 258.77 259.21 259.55 259.97 257.63 258.40
  House Farm Bill 259.24 258.25 258.43 258.67 258.85 259.25 259.55 259.78 260.09 258.69 259.12
  Senate Farm Bill 260.28 259.37 259.29 259.44 259.42 259.54 259.75 259.92 260.16 259.56 259.69
    Senate - House 1.03 1.12 0.85 0.77 0.57 0.30 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.87 0.56
Wheat
  Baseline Policies 62.39 62.12 62.55 62.81 63.04 63.37 63.76 63.90 64.17 62.58 63.12
  House Farm Bill 63.12 62.79 63.10 63.26 63.39 63.67 63.99 64.06 64.29 63.14 63.52
  Senate Farm Bill 64.41 63.82 63.73 63.72 63.70 63.79 63.93 63.99 64.18 63.88 63.92
    Senate - House 1.29 1.03 0.63 0.46 0.30 0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 0.74 0.40
Corn
  Baseline Policies 79.74 79.96 79.98 79.97 80.14 80.51 80.47 80.47 80.53 79.96 80.20
  House Farm Bill 80.72 80.76 80.63 80.50 80.59 80.87 80.71 80.67 80.71 80.64 80.68
  Senate Farm Bill 81.70 81.56 81.28 80.98 80.98 81.07 81.01 80.90 80.83 81.30 81.14
    Senate - House 0.97 0.80 0.65 0.48 0.39 0.19 0.30 0.23 0.11 0.66 0.46
Sorghum
  Baseline Policies 9.49 9.30 9.26 9.20 9.17 9.14 9.07 9.03 9.00 9.28 9.18
  House Farm Bill 9.93 9.73 9.63 9.52 9.45 9.35 9.24 9.17 9.11 9.65 9.46
  Senate Farm Bill 10.24 9.90 9.75 9.60 9.53 9.43 9.34 9.25 9.18 9.80 9.58
    Senate - House 0.31 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.12
Barley
  Baseline Policies 5.86 5.84 5.84 5.78 5.72 5.70 5.65 5.63 5.61 5.81 5.74
  House Farm Bill 5.94 5.88 5.85 5.81 5.75 5.73 5.67 5.65 5.63 5.85 5.77
  Senate Farm Bill 5.96 5.90 5.89 5.86 5.83 5.79 5.75 5.71 5.69 5.89 5.82
    Senate - House 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05
Oats
  Baseline Policies 4.13 4.07 4.07 4.06 4.01 3.96 3.91 3.84 3.79 4.07 3.98
  House Farm Bill 4.21 4.14 4.14 4.11 4.05 4.00 3.94 3.87 3.81 4.13 4.03
  Senate Farm Bill 4.32 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.20 4.14 4.09 4.02 3.96 4.26 4.17
    Senate - House 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14
Soybeans
  Baseline Policies 74.61 74.20 74.28 74.62 74.76 74.80 75.06 75.45 75.70 74.49 74.83
  House Farm Bill 73.55 73.32 73.54 73.94 74.16 74.24 74.63 75.07 75.33 73.70 74.20
  Senate Farm Bill 73.43 72.99 73.19 73.61 73.90 74.09 74.42 74.90 75.25 73.43 73.98
    Senate - House -0.12 -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 -0.26 -0.15 -0.21 -0.17 -0.08 -0.27 -0.22
Sunflowers
  Baseline Policies 2.74 2.73 2.72 2.74 2.75 2.75 2.77 2.78 2.78 2.73 2.75
  House Farm Bill 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.71 2.73 2.73 2.75 2.77 2.77 2.70 2.72
  Senate Farm Bill 2.68 2.67 2.68 2.70 2.72 2.74 2.75 2.77 2.78 2.69 2.72
    Senate - House -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Upland Cotton
  Baseline Policies 15.43 15.35 15.29 15.26 15.23 15.17 15.17 15.12 15.07 15.31 15.23
  House Farm Bill 15.64 15.53 15.45 15.40 15.34 15.27 15.25 15.18 15.12 15.47 15.35
  Senate Farm Bill 14.42 14.95 15.10 15.27 15.18 15.10 15.08 15.02 14.98 14.98 15.01
    Senate - House -1.23 -0.58 -0.35 -0.13 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 -0.49 -0.35
Rice
  Baseline Policies 3.40 3.39 3.39 3.39 3.38 3.37 3.35 3.33 3.31 3.39 3.37
  House Farm Bill 3.43 3.41 3.41 3.41 3.39 3.38 3.37 3.34 3.32 3.41 3.39
  Senate Farm Bill 3.13 3.33 3.33 3.37 3.33 3.33 3.32 3.30 3.28 3.30 3.30
    Senate - House -0.31 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.09
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Table A2. Impacts of Alternative Farm Bills on Crop Prices
Crop Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 02-06 Avg 02-10 Avg
Wheat (Dollars per Bushel)
  Baseline Policies 2.91 3.02 3.09 3.16 3.25 3.34 3.40 3.47 3.57 3.09 3.25
  House Farm Bill 2.89 2.99 3.06 3.14 3.23 3.32 3.39 3.46 3.56 3.06 3.23
  Senate Farm Bill 2.85 2.95 3.03 3.11 3.21 3.31 3.38 3.46 3.55 3.03 3.21
    Senate - House -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02
Corn
  Baseline Policies 2.08 2.11 2.15 2.22 2.29 2.36 2.42 2.49 2.56 2.17 2.30
  House Farm Bill 2.04 2.06 2.10 2.18 2.26 2.33 2.40 2.47 2.55 2.13 2.27
  Senate Farm Bill 2.01 2.02 2.06 2.14 2.23 2.32 2.39 2.46 2.54 2.09 2.24
    Senate - House -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
Sorghum
  Baseline Policies 1.85 1.89 1.93 2.01 2.08 2.13 2.19 2.25 2.32 1.95 2.07
  House Farm Bill 1.80 1.83 1.87 1.96 2.03 2.09 2.16 2.23 2.31 1.90 2.03
  Senate Farm Bill 1.76 1.78 1.83 1.92 2.01 2.08 2.14 2.21 2.29 1.86 2.00
    Senate - House -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
Barley
  Baseline Policies 2.25 2.27 2.29 2.33 2.39 2.44 2.48 2.54 2.60 2.30 2.40
  House Farm Bill 2.21 2.23 2.25 2.30 2.36 2.41 2.46 2.52 2.59 2.27 2.37
  Senate Farm Bill 2.19 2.19 2.21 2.26 2.32 2.39 2.44 2.50 2.57 2.24 2.34
    Senate - House -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
Oats
  Baseline Policies 1.20 1.24 1.26 1.29 1.33 1.36 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.26 1.33
  House Farm Bill 1.17 1.20 1.22 1.26 1.30 1.33 1.37 1.40 1.44 1.23 1.30
  Senate Farm Bill 1.14 1.16 1.17 1.21 1.25 1.28 1.32 1.35 1.39 1.18 1.25
    Senate - House -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Soybeans
  Baseline Policies 4.61 4.76 4.95 5.07 5.19 5.36 5.50 5.63 5.72 4.92 5.20
  House Farm Bill 4.68 4.82 5.00 5.12 5.23 5.39 5.53 5.65 5.75 4.97 5.24
  Senate Farm Bill 4.69 4.84 5.02 5.14 5.24 5.40 5.54 5.67 5.75 4.99 5.25
    Senate - House 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Sunflowers (Dollars per Hundredweight)
  Baseline Policies 8.38 8.66 8.97 9.21 9.45 9.78 10.07 10.33 10.59 8.93 9.49
  House Farm Bill 8.52 8.79 9.09 9.31 9.53 9.86 10.13 10.39 10.64 9.05 9.58
  Senate Farm Bill 8.53 8.83 9.13 9.35 9.56 9.88 10.16 10.41 10.65 9.08 9.61
    Senate - House 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03
Upland Cotton (Dollars per Pound)
  Baseline Policies 0.549 0.551 0.556 0.562 0.569 0.580 0.587 0.596 0.605 0.557 0.573
  House Farm Bill 0.544 0.545 0.552 0.558 0.565 0.577 0.584 0.594 0.603 0.553 0.569
  Senate Farm Bill 0.571 0.566 0.565 0.566 0.572 0.584 0.591 0.601 0.610 0.568 0.581
    Senate - House 0.027 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.011
Rice (Dollars per Hundredweight)
  Baseline Policies 6.59 7.00 7.07 7.28 7.43 7.70 7.79 7.99 8.20 7.07 7.45
  House Farm Bill 6.50 6.91 6.98 7.20 7.36 7.64 7.73 7.94 8.16 6.99 7.38
  Senate Farm Bill 7.28 7.35 7.31 7.39 7.57 7.85 7.93 8.14 8.35 7.38 7.69
    Senate - House 0.79 0.44 0.33 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.39 0.31
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Table A3. Impacts of Alternative Farm Bills on Crop Gross Returns*
Crop Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 02-06 Avg 02-10 Avg
Wheat (Dollars per Bushel)
  Baseline Policies 3.36 3.43 3.47 3.52 3.60 3.68 3.72 3.79 3.88 3.48 3.61
  House Farm Bill 3.81 3.81 3.81 3.81 3.84 3.86 3.89 3.93 4.00 3.82 3.86
  Senate Farm Bill 3.82 3.83 3.76 3.75 3.72 3.72 3.73 3.75 3.81 3.78 3.77
    Senate - House 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.19 -0.04 -0.10
Corn
  Baseline Policies 2.38 2.41 2.42 2.46 2.51 2.55 2.61 2.66 2.73 2.44 2.53
  House Farm Bill 2.63 2.64 2.63 2.65 2.67 2.68 2.73 2.76 2.82 2.64 2.69
  Senate Farm Bill 2.60 2.61 2.57 2.59 2.57 2.60 2.64 2.67 2.73 2.59 2.62
    Senate - House -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07
Sorghum
  Baseline Policies 2.18 2.21 2.23 2.29 2.33 2.37 2.42 2.48 2.55 2.25 2.34
  House Farm Bill 2.56 2.56 2.55 2.57 2.56 2.58 2.60 2.63 2.68 2.56 2.59
  Senate Farm Bill 2.55 2.51 2.50 2.51 2.49 2.51 2.52 2.54 2.58 2.51 2.52
    Senate - House -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07
Barley
  Baseline Policies 2.49 2.53 2.55 2.55 2.58 2.60 2.63 2.67 2.74 2.54 2.59
  House Farm Bill 2.67 2.69 2.68 2.69 2.70 2.71 2.74 2.77 2.82 2.69 2.72
  Senate Farm Bill 2.74 2.75 2.73 2.74 2.73 2.74 2.75 2.77 2.80 2.74 2.75
    Senate - House 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.03
Oats
  Baseline Policies 1.39 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.45 1.47 1.49 1.51 1.54 1.41 1.45
  House Farm Bill 1.53 1.52 1.53 1.53 1.54 1.55 1.57 1.58 1.60 1.53 1.55
  Senate Farm Bill 1.73 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.76 1.77 1.74 1.75
    Senate - House 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.20
Soybeans
  Baseline Policies 5.56 5.58 5.62 5.66 5.69 5.74 5.81 5.90 5.97 5.62 5.72
  House Farm Bill 5.79 5.80 5.83 5.87 5.90 5.95 6.02 6.11 6.18 5.84 5.94
  Senate Farm Bill 6.06 6.08 6.04 6.07 6.04 6.06 6.10 6.17 6.23 6.06 6.09
    Senate - House 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.15
Upland Cotton (Dollars per Pound)
  Baseline Policies 0.627 0.628 0.630 0.632 0.635 0.642 0.647 0.653 0.663 0.630 0.640
  House Farm Bill 0.720 0.718 0.716 0.714 0.713 0.713 0.714 0.714 0.718 0.716 0.716
  Senate Farm Bill 0.745 0.741 0.711 0.710 0.700 0.700 0.701 0.702 0.706 0.721 0.713
    Senate - House 0.025 0.024 -0.005 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 0.005 -0.003
Rice (Dollars per Hundredweight)
  Baseline Policies 10.44 10.48 10.49 10.52 10.57 10.63 10.67 10.75 10.81 10.50 10.59
  House Farm Bill 11.65 11.50 11.48 11.38 11.37 11.30 11.32 11.32 11.32 11.48 11.41
  Senate Farm Bill 11.89 11.68 11.58 11.49 11.53 11.56 11.61 11.67 11.72 11.63 11.64
    Senate - House 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.28 0.35 0.40 0.15 0.23
* Returns do not reflect payment limitation restrictions that are assumed in the analysis of the Senate Farm Bill.
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Table A4. Impacts of Alternative Farm Bills on Government Outlays
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 02-06 Sum 02-11 Sum
Net CCC Outlays (Million Dollars)
  Baseline Policies 13,155 13,030 12,671 11,987 11,408 10,669 9,869 9,491 9,229 8,979 62,252 110,488
  House Farm Bill 15,021 19,211 20,669 19,698 18,780 17,289 15,969 15,264 14,474 13,863 93,379 170,239
  Senate Farm Bill 19,369 23,115 18,704 20,699 17,926 17,108 15,621 14,526 13,713 13,173 99,813 173,954
    Senate - House 4,349 3,904 (1,965) 1,001 (855) (181) (348) (738) (761) (690) 6,434 3,716
Wheat
  Baseline Policies 1,353 1,281 1,217 1,179 1,143 1,116 1,103 1,089 1,081 1,035 6,173 11,597
  House Farm Bill 1,442 2,620 2,362 2,195 2,016 1,832 1,667 1,574 1,476 1,399 10,635 18,583
  Senate Farm Bill 2,495 2,468 1,626 1,931 1,372 1,357 1,138 988 863 836 9,892 15,075
    Senate - House 1,052 (152) (736) (263) (644) (475) (529) (586) (613) (563) (742) (3,508)
Corn
  Baseline Policies 3,261 3,328 3,297 3,004 2,773 2,532 2,257 2,195 2,111 2,022 15,663 26,779
  House Farm Bill 3,477 5,115 6,469 6,041 5,548 4,913 4,270 3,950 3,609 3,401 26,651 46,794
  Senate Farm Bill 4,531 6,479 5,045 5,660 4,326 3,995 3,379 3,007 2,555 2,428 26,041 41,405
    Senate - House 1,055 1,364 (1,424) (382) (1,222) (917) (892) (943) (1,054) (973) (610) (5,389)
Other Feed Grains
  Baseline Policies 479 477 468 444 409 376 356 343 332 318 2,277 4,001
  House Farm Bill 494 812 867 809 744 661 602 554 505 477 3,725 6,524
  Senate Farm Bill 673 908 729 811 660 639 577 518 458 433 3,781 6,405
    Senate - House 178 97 (137) 2 (84) (22) (25) (36) (47) (44) 55 (119)
Soybeans
  Baseline Policies 3,092 2,942 2,590 2,164 1,927 1,665 1,323 1,076 980 938 12,715 18,697
  House Farm Bill 3,773 2,909 2,967 2,560 2,349 2,095 1,791 1,563 1,466 1,386 14,559 22,859
  Senate Farm Bill 4,681 3,967 2,840 3,089 2,468 2,513 2,111 1,817 1,689 1,587 17,045 26,762
    Senate - House 908 1,058 (128) 529 119 418 320 255 223 201 2,486 3,903
Upland Cotton
  Baseline Policies 1,001 981 972 909 857 816 784 768 736 705 4,720 8,529
  House Farm Bill 1,130 2,082 2,057 1,957 1,864 1,769 1,664 1,600 1,506 1,414 9,091 17,044
  Senate Farm Bill 1,912 1,965 1,321 1,689 1,322 1,503 1,392 1,340 1,253 1,178 8,208 14,874
    Senate - House 782 (117) (736) (268) (543) (266) (272) (260) (254) (237) (882) (2,170)
Rice
  Baseline Policies 880 838 772 759 724 700 656 648 618 592 3,972 7,186
  House Farm Bill 944 1,188 1,074 1,055 986 945 866 849 799 759 5,247 9,464
  Senate Farm Bill 1,015 946 908 912 881 852 806 799 770 731 4,662 8,621
    Senate - House 71 (241) (167) (143) (105) (92) (60) (50) (29) (28) (585) (843)
Peanuts
  Baseline Policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  House Farm Bill 298 444 454 448 449 207 202 199 191 197 2,093 3,088
  Senate Farm Bill 321 657 647 642 643 379 374 372 365 368 2,911 4,768
    Senate - House 24 213 194 194 194 172 172 173 174 171 819 1,680
Conservation
  Baseline Policies 2,030 1,927 1,991 2,033 2,043 2,043 2,043 2,043 2,043 2,043 10,024 20,237
  House Farm Bill 2,296 2,611 2,970 3,092 3,257 3,435 3,542 3,629 3,594 3,647 14,226 32,073
  Senate Farm Bill 2,318 2,809 3,432 4,004 4,378 4,366 4,385 4,239 4,327 4,396 16,941 38,655
    Senate - House 22 198 462 912 1,121 931 843 610 733 749 2,715 6,582
Other Provisions*
  Baseline Policies 1,057 1,259 1,364 1,496 1,533 1,420 1,347 1,329 1,329 1,327 6,708 13,461
  House Farm Bill 1,166 1,431 1,449 1,540 1,567 1,433 1,365 1,347 1,328 1,183 7,153 13,810
  Senate Farm Bill 1,423 2,916 2,155 1,960 1,876 1,503 1,459 1,446 1,433 1,217 10,331 17,390
    Senate - House 257 1,485 707 420 309 70 93 100 105 34 3,178 3,580
* Includes dairy, sugar, minor oilseeds, and others. Savings due to payment restrictions on previously-cropped land are included in Senate total. 
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Table A5.  Impacts of Alternative Farm Bills on the Dairy Sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 02-06 Avg 02-11 Avg
Milk Production (Billion pounds)
  Baseline Policies 168.0 170.1 172.5 174.9 177.3 179.7 182.1 184.5 186.9 189.3 172.6 178.5
  House Farm Bill 168.3 170.7 173.0 175.4 177.7 180.0 182.3 184.6 186.9 189.3 173.0 178.8
  Senate Farm Bill 168.6 171.0 173.3 175.6 177.8 180.0 182.3 184.6 186.9 189.3 173.3 178.9
    Senate - House 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
NFD Removals (Million pounds)
  Baseline Policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  House Farm Bill 115 175 150 93 60 22 0 0 0 0 119 62
  Senate Farm Bill 126 188 163 99 60 0 0 0 0 0 127 64
    Senate - House 11 13 13 6 0 (22) 0 0 0 0 9 2
Cheese Price (Dollars per pound)
  Baseline Policies 1.27 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.30 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.27 1.30
  House Farm Bill 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.31 1.31 1.32 1.34 1.29 1.30
  Senate Farm Bill 1.28 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.31 1.31 1.32 1.34 1.28 1.30
    Senate - House -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
NFD Price
  Baseline Policies 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.84 0.88
  House Farm Bill 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.91
  Senate Farm Bill 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.91
    Senate - House 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Butter Price
  Baseline Policies 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.50 1.51 1.46 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.49 1.51 1.49
  House Farm Bill 1.39 1.37 1.38 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.47 1.49 1.48 1.39 1.43
  Senate Farm Bill 1.36 1.34 1.35 1.38 1.41 1.49 1.45 1.47 1.49 1.48 1.37 1.42
    Senate - House -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01
Class III Price (Dollars per Cwt)
  Baseline Policies 11.52 11.46 11.59 11.78 11.90 12.07 12.22 12.32 12.44 12.62 11.65 11.99
  House Farm Bill 11.75 11.72 11.79 11.90 11.98 12.05 12.15 12.27 12.40 12.59 11.83 12.06
  Senate Farm Bill 11.70 11.63 11.72 11.85 11.94 11.93 12.14 12.26 12.40 12.59 11.77 12.01
    Senate - House -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.05
Class IV Price
  Baseline Policies 11.87 11.82 11.93 12.07 12.18 12.27 12.39 12.47 12.57 12.71 11.97 12.23
  House Farm Bill 12.00 11.93 11.98 12.07 12.14 12.19 12.29 12.40 12.52 12.68 12.03 12.22
  Senate Farm Bill 11.89 11.77 11.86 11.99 12.08 12.12 12.28 12.39 12.52 12.68 11.92 12.16
    Senate - House -0.11 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.11 -0.06
All Milk Price
  Baseline Policies 12.81 12.74 12.84 12.97 13.08 13.18 13.30 13.37 13.46 13.60 12.89 13.13
  House Farm Bill 12.99 12.91 12.94 13.03 13.08 13.12 13.21 13.30 13.42 13.57 12.99 13.16
  Senate Farm Bill 12.89 12.77 12.84 12.96 13.03 13.04 13.20 13.30 13.41 13.57 12.90 13.10
    Senate - House -0.09 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09 -0.06
- continued -
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Table A5.  Impacts of Alternative Farm Bills on the Dairy Sector (continued)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 02-06 Avg 02-11 Avg
Direct Payments * (Dollars per Cwt)
  Baseline Policies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  House Farm Bill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Senate Farm Bill 0.44 0.46 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.12
    Senate - House 0.44 0.46 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.12
Milk Revenue
  Baseline Policies 12.81 12.74 12.84 12.97 13.08 13.18 13.30 13.37 13.46 13.60 12.89 13.13
  House Farm Bill 12.99 12.91 12.94 13.03 13.08 13.12 13.21 13.30 13.42 13.57 12.99 13.16
  Senate Farm Bill 13.34 13.24 13.05 13.01 13.03 13.04 13.20 13.30 13.41 13.57 13.13 13.22
    Senate - House 0.35 0.33 0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.14 0.06
Gov't Cost - Price Support (Million Dollars, Fiscal Year)
  Baseline Policies 112 98 99 99 100 100 100 100 99 99 508 1,007
  House Farm Bill 130 232 214 171 146 118 101 101 100 100 894 1,414
  Senate Farm Bill 139 242 224 176 146 101 100 100 99 99 927 1,426
    Senate - House 8 10 10 5 0 -17 -1 -1 -1 -0 33 13
Gov't Cost - Nat'l Dairy Program
  Baseline Policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  House Farm Bill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Senate Farm Bill 123 1,222 470 161 24 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 2,000
    Senate - House 123 1,222 470 161 24 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 2,000
* Payments spread across total milk production.
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Appendix II – Stochastic Comparisons 
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As previously discussed, a stochastic methodology was used to analyze each of 
the bills relative to the baseline.  The approach allows for an evaluation of the policies 
under numerous price and production outcomes.  This is especially important given the 
counter-cyclical nature of the two bills.  This appendix addresses some of the major 
results of the stochastic results. 
 
Crop Returns 
Both the House and Senate bills are designed to support overall crop returns as 
market prices decline.  Figures A1 and A2 show a comparison of returns and prices for 
the 2002 and 2006 crops, respectively.  Both returns and prices are presented as indices 
that are weighted across the eight major program crops.  An index value of 1.0 is 
equivalent to the average price for the 2002 crop. 
 
As shown in Figure A1, crop returns stabilize as the price index falls below 1.1.  
Furthermore, both bills generate roughly the same return at lower price levels.  It is 
interesting to note that the House bill produces slightly better returns when the price 
index is approximately 0.8 as opposed to an index of 1.0.  This is due to the fact that over 
a certain price range, changes in price are offset by both changes in marketing loan gains 
and counter-cyclical payments.  A similar pattern holds for the Senate version in 2006 
(Figure A2).  
 
While both policies give similar returns at low prices, there are differences at the 
higher price levels.  As prices increase, the marketing loan gains and counter-cyclical 
payments diminish and eventually disappear.  At that stage, fixed payments are the only 
contribution of government payments to overall crop returns.  Since fixed payments are 
higher under the Senate bill for the 2002 crop, total returns under the Senate option 
exceed those under the House bill at the higher price levels.  For 2006, the reverse is true 
as House returns exceed Senate returns at the higher prices. Distributions for selected 
years of individual crop returns can be found in Figures A3-A6. 
 
Government Outlays and Farm Income 
The greater income protection offered by either bill results in higher government 
costs.  The counter-cyclical nature of the bills leads to significant outlays when market 
prices are low.  As shown in Figure A7, outlays under both bills can be as high as $30 
billion, while outlays under the House bill could fall as low as $10 billion under a high-
price scenario.  With higher fixed payments in the early years, outlays under the Senate 
option remain at or above $12 billion.  By 2006, the roles of the two change with higher 
fixed payments under the House bill. 
 
Based on the 500 stochastic results, 2003 net farm income under both bills 
exceeds $45 billion in 70% of the outcomes.  Under the Senate bill, there is a 45% chance 
that farm income exceeds $50 billion, while the House bill gives farm income in excess 
of $50 billion in 40% of the outcomes.  By 2010, net farm income under the House bill 
generally exceeds levels produced under the Senate version.   
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Figure A1. Returns vs Prices, 2002 Crop
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Figure A2. Returns vs Prices, 2006 Crop
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Figure A3. Distribution of 2002 Corn Returns, $/Bu
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Figure A4. Distribution of 2006 Corn Returns, $/Bu
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Figure A5. Distribution of 2002 Cotton Returns, $/Lb
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Figure A6. Distribution of 2006 Cotton Returns, $/Lb
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Figure A7. Gov't Costs vs Crop Prices, FY 2003
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Figure A8. Gov't Costs vs Crop Prices, FY 2006
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Figure A9. Distribution of 2003 Net Farm Income, Bil $
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Figure A10. Distribution of 2010 Net Farm Income, Bil $
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